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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FLOOD
INSURANCE RE-MAPPING CONTROVERSY IN
PORTLAND, MAINE
Wesley Davis*

I. INTRODUCTION
Releasing its first updated floodplain map for a major New England
harbor,1 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) imposed
severe building restrictions on Portland, Maine, the largest foreign
inbound transit tonnage port in the U.S.,2 threatening to leave this
sheltered waterfront with only fishing shacks.3 Portland is naturally
protected by islands4 and has been used for centuries as a safe haven for
ocean-going vessels, including oil tankers, cruise ships, and Coast Guard
frigates.5 Minute storm damage has been reported over this time.6 Over

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law.
1. Tom Bell, New Flood Map – and a New Model, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 5,
2010, at A1.
2. Welcome to Portland’s Downtown District, http://www.portlandmaine.com/
index.php?sec=2 (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Portland’s Downtown District].
3. Tom Porter, Portland Officials Optimistic After Talks on FEMA Flood Map,
MAINE PUBLIC BROADCASTING, Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.mpbn.net/News/
MaineNews/tabid/181/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3475/ItemId/9544/Default.aspx.
4. See Christopher Kessler, Sebago Technics Working with FEMA on Flood Map,
SOUTH
PORTLANDER,
http://fwix.com/portlandme/share/a2bb34d170/
THE
sebego_technics_working_with_fema_on_flood_map (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
5. See Porter, supra note 3; Tom Bell, FEMA Threatens Harbor Construction;
Portland Officials Say a Revised Flood Insurance Map Would Devastate the City’s
Working Waterfront, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 10, 2009, at A1.
6. See Evan Lehmann, Port City Pushes Back Against Washington’s Tightening
Flood
Insurance
Definitions,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
29,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/09/29/29climatewire-port-city-pushes-back-againstwashingtons-ti-24450.html; Bell, supra note 5.
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the past thirty years, only three insurance claims, totaling $36,000, have
been paid out.7
FEMA has an incentive to designate as many properties as possible
as “high risk.” Such a classification arrests development and increases
the local share of the cost of flooding. These results further the flood
program’s goal of keeping property and people out of harm’s way and
reducing the public’s share of the flooding cost.8
In Portland, where benign waters do not even lap against piers, the
agency declared that waves were capable of surging three feet in the air
and crashing down on waterfront property.9 The federal government
may have zealously cast too wide a net. The result is that the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), a scheme created for financial reasons,
is unnecessarily working against its own purpose by halting development
and threatening to wreak economic havoc.
To rectify this, economic factors should be considered when
determining building restrictions. Until this is done, cities like Portland
should not comply with the restrictions. They can protect their economic
development interest and are likely to escape any serious repercussions
for not complying. FEMA has been unable to adequately enforce its
building restrictions and its sanctions are light. Courts also favor
noncompliant municipalities.
This Comment will explore these issues. In Part II, we will gain an
understanding of the policy reasons behind building restrictions. We will
then learn why these policies are fatally flawed. In Part III, we will
survey the purpose and limitations of FEMA’s national re-mapping effort
and how it is being received across the country. Then, we will hear
Portland’s story, including the local officials’ arguments against the new
restrictions on development. In Part IV, the Author argues that Congress
and FEMA should incorporate economic factors into the agency’s

7. Tom Bell, FEMA Delays New Flood Map for Portland, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
Sept. 21, 2009, at A1.
8. Id. See generally DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 201, (Daniel
A. Farber and Jim Chen eds., Aspen Publishers 2006) [hereinafter Farber] (discussing the
role of mitigation); Martha Thompson & Izaskun Gaviria, WEATHERING THE STORM:
LESSONS IN RISK REDUCTION FROM CUBA (Oxfam America 2004) (studying Cuba’s ability
to prevent development in disaster-prone areas); Government Accounting Office,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY: OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 12-14 (Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter GAO],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do6183t.pdf (describing a pilot program that
requires “repetitive-loss” property owners to sell their property to FEMA or face higher
insurance rates).
9. Lehmann, supra note 6.
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determination of building restrictions. In Part V, we will get an update
on Portland. Then, we will walk through the options available to similar
port cities stuck with severe building restrictions. The most palatable
one is non-compliance. We will discuss why it enjoys a favorable legal
position, including courts’ unwillingness to burden municipalities with
massive liability. We will also look at the risks involved.
II. FEDERAL FLOOD POLICY
Flooding is a matter of public policy because market economies do
not have the capacity to handle the problem. Involved in nearly 90
percent of all disasters, flooding is the most common natural disaster and
the most destructive to property.10 The risk of exposure is so great that it
is actuarially unsound for insurance companies to insure against it.11
Property owners will not find flood coverage in their homeowner’s
insurance.12 A catastrophic flooding event exceeds the capacity of the
insurance industry.13 All fifty U.S. states are subject to the risk of a
catastrophic flooding event.14
In the early years of American life, flooding was a problem for local
government. Natural disasters, isolated instances in localized areas, were
not within the purview of the national government. Federalism was in its
purest form. The central government confined itself chiefly to matters of
international and national concerns. States dominated their local
jurisdictions and the federal government had neither the political will nor
the power to wield control over local matters. Accordingly, federal aid
did not flow in to relieve victims of natural disasters.15 Instead, local
officials and private entities responded.16 As one commentator pointed
out, victims “were pretty much on their own.”17

10. RAWLE O. KING, FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE: THE REPETITIVE-LOSS PROBLEM ii,
1 (Congressional Research Service, June 30, 2005).
11. RAWLE O. KING, MIDWEST FLOODING DISASTER: RETHINKING FEDERAL FLOOD
INSURANCE? 4 (Congressional Research Service, Aug. 11, 2008).
12. RAWLE O. KING, HURRICANE KATRINA: INSURANCE LOSSES AND NATIONAL
CAPACITIES FOR FINANCING DISASTER RISK 7 (Congressional Research Service, Sept. 15,
2005).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Stephen Griffin, Did the Constitution Fail New Orleans?, BALKANIZATION, (Oct.
12, 2005, 10:31 P.M.), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/10/did-constitution-fail-neworleans-part.html.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Eventually, this early federalism eroded and the national government
adopted a “levee-only” structural approach. The federal government was
spurred on by major flooding events.18 The crush of extensive property
damage and the expense of public disaster relief following three decades
of Mississippi River flooding compelled Congress to take its first major
crack at flood policy.19 It created the Mississippi River Commission in
1879,20 and charged it with oversight of levee development for the next
fifty years.21 The federal government was operating in the era when man
believed he could overcome any problem with engineering. Redirecting
the natural flow of water was a prime example. In 1917, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers got heavily involved.22 The 1930s and 1940s saw
$11 billion of federal levee spending.23
Enthusiasm for the structural approach began to wane in the 1950s
and 1960s. The sheer cost and vastness of the levee-only approach
proved unwieldy and the growing environmental conscience of the U.S.
was repulsed by the resulting environmental destruction.24 Later it would
be proved that the levees would sometimes fail to keep the water out. In
these instances, levees actually increased the amount of property damage
because the public rapidly developed property behind levees under the
false assumption that they would be flood-proof.25
These structural disappointments got policymakers thinking about
non-structural approaches, especially insurance and mitigation. It was
another slew of disasters that urged policymakers to consider fabricating
an insurance system. Hurricane Betsey and other storms in the 1960s
ravaged the South and flooded the upper Mississippi River.26 A huge
part of the cost of disaster aid was put on the federal government. The
taxpayer picked up the ultimate tab.
Policymakers thought a
manufactured insurance system could relieve the burden. The hope was
that it would re-allocate the cost of the risk of flooding back to those who
took the risk by living in floodplains. The government would act just
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
King, supra note 11, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DAVID GODSCHALK ET AL, NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION: RECASTING DISASTER
POLICY AND PLANNING 31 (Island Press 1999).
24. Id.; King, supra note 11, at 4.
25. Charles S. Clark, Disaster Response: Does the Country Need a New National
Strategy?, 3 CQ RESEARCHER 889 (1993), available at http://library.cqpress.com/
cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1993101500#NOTE[6].
26. King, supra note 10, at 3.
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like an insurance company, spreading the risk across its policyholders
through premiums.
But, it could not allocate all of the cost of the risk back to those
taking the risk. The premiums would be prohibitively expensive.
Unaffordable premiums prevented a market-based insurance system from
developing in the first place. A government system would have to allow
for affordable insurance premiums.
But by doing so, it would not be spreading the great financial risk of
flooding in an actuarially-sound manner, leaving it and the taxpayer
exposed to that risk.
To try to deal with this, policymakers
recommended mitigation. The federal government would mitigate
damage by discouraging construction in floodplains. In theory, these
requirements would reduce the amount of property in harm’s way and
bring down the cost of claims.
A. Mitigation
Mitigation has been widely lauded as the most effective flooding
response. Commentators Daniel A. Farber and Jim Chen call it
“crucial.”27 Another commentator, David Godschalk, argues that it is the
most critical of the four stages of disaster response: mitigation,
preparation, response, and recovery.28 Of these stages, mitigation is the
only one that takes place well before the event. Advance action is much
more cost-effective than post-disaster reconstruction, particularly for
recurrent damage.29 Effective mitigation reduces the magnitude of future
disasters and results in a substantially reduced cost for both response and
recovery.30 Many observers feel the only “sensible” policy is “strategic
retreat.”31 Farber and Chen echo this sentiment, wondering if the most
effective way to deal with disaster is to “stay out of the danger zone.”32
Congress adopted this insurance-mitigation approach in the form of a
carrot-and-stick program. In 1968, Congress created the NFIP, currently
administered by FEMA, with passage of the National Flood Insurance
Act (NFIA).
Through the program, Congress offers subsidized
insurance. But the subsidies come at a price. Property owners can only
receive it if their municipality takes certain steps to mitigate future
27. Farber, supra note 8, at 201.
28. GODSCHALK, supra note 23, at 17.
29. Id. at 5, 17.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id. at 34.
32. Farber, supra note 8, at 213. Oddly enough, “strategic retreat” is little more than a
concession of defeat and an inability to effectively deal with flooding and its threat.
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damage. The municipality must implement land use controls specifically
prescribed by FEMA that restrict the development of floodplain property.
Land use control is the NFIP’s leading mitigation device, but it also
reduces flood damage by acquiring high-risk properties and relocating
their owners.
In practice, however, the mitigation scheme, like federal policies
before it, has been a disappointment. A policy of acquisition can bring
some isolated successes, but it is not a practical large-scale solution.
Policymakers began exploring eminent domain in the 1970s and 1980s.33
Tulsa, Oklahoma, was an early pioneer when it began clearing
development out of its floodplain in the 1970s.34 By the 1990s it had
acquired 875 buildings.35 When the Army Corps of Engineers offered to
build a $3.5 million levee for Soldier’s Grove, Wisconsin, it chose
instead to relocate the entire town outside the floodplain.36 In 1983, a
cost-benefit analysis by the Flooded Properties Purchase Program
(FPPP), the NFIP’s acquisition arm, resulted in the purchase and
demolition of a 300-home neighborhood in Baytown, Texas, that had
been the repeated victim of flooding and was in the process of being
rebuilt.37 After the 1993 Midwest floods, the federal government
implemented an aggressive relocation plan, orchestrating 156 buyout
projects in nine states, acquiring more than 9,000 properties.38
These were all successful relocation projects but they comprise only
a negligible slice of the number and value of properties that stand in
harm’s way. Lack of funding or political or psychological will prevent
any meaningful progress. Both the cost and the idea of a comprehensive
buyout strategy are unpalatable. The FPPP has been historically
underfunded. Only a small number of properties, about 100 per year, can
be purchased.39
Unlike acquisitions, land use controls are affordable but their
corresponding lack of financial incentives has been their downfall. This
lack conspires with the value of floodplain property and the result is
major increases in floodplain development. In spite of the cost of a 1993
flood, the St. Louis region and several other localities reloaded their

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Godschalk, supra note 23, at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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floodplains with new urban and suburban development.40 When these
vulnerable areas were hit again by another flood, the cost of disaster
assistance vastly increased. Increased costs like these wipe out any
potential savings gained by successful mitigation efforts elsewhere.41
This shortcoming is traceable to human nature and property rights.
Land use controls involve the unnatural human trade-off of economic
sacrifices today for unknown benefits at some unknown future time.
While advance action is the reason mitigation can be so effective, it is
also the reason why mitigation is so difficult to implement. The
authoritarian state of Cuba has been able to enforce an effective
mitigation regime,42 but governments blessed with (or hampered by)
market economies have not been so fortunate.43 Proponents of land use
control surmise that the public just does not understand the potential
benefits.44
A bigger roadblock may be the cultural belief that owners have a
fundamental right to dispense with their property as they see fit. Owners
believe they have some kind of natural right to their property and this
belief is reinforced by our political and judicial systems.45 It is written
into the Constitution.46 Courts have been willing to extend the Fifth
Amendment limitation on taking property to the mere minimization of
property rights47 or to regulations that go “too far.”48 The protection
afforded by these cases is readily transferable to flood-related land use
controls. Such an application would in turn make these controls
prohibitively expensive.

40. Nicholas Pinter, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back on U.S. Floodplains, 308
SCIENCE 207, 207-08 (2005).
41. Id.
42. See generally Thompson, supra note 8.
43. Farber, supra note 8, at 213.
44. See Godschalk, supra note 23, at 17.
45. Farber, supra note 8, at 220.
46. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
47. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (holding that the installation of a cable line was a per se taking).
48. E.g., Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that a regulation can
go “too far” and constitute a taking); see generally Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y., 438
U.S. 104 (1978) (establishing that a regulatory taking can occur when a regulation
unreasonably interferes with “investment-backed expectations”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that beachfront land use controls barring
permanent structures is a taking).
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III. RE-MAPPING AND PORTLAND HARBOR
The futility of mitigation policies, especially land use controls, has
become evident, but they are still law. FEMA must try to maintain
accurate floodplain maps so it can determine the specific land use
controls required, as well as the amount of insurance premiums. In 1997,
the agency began updating its cartographic mapping system with more
accurate and accessible digital maps.49 In 2003, it formalized this effort
with the Flood Map Modernization Program, which is part of a broader
mapping, assessment, and planning regime that is funded through 2014.50
Its goal is to re-map the land on which 93 percent of the nation’s
population resides.51 Many maps had not been updated in thirty to forty
years.52 Some were based on ninety-year-old data.53 Cumbersome and
full of “gross errors,” the old maps prevented effective determination and
enforcement of land use controls.54 The new maps increase FEMA’s
ability to identify the severest areas, which is resulting in a broader
floodplain determination and higher risk assessments for more
properties.55
Despite advances, the re-mapping effort is still seriously
handicapped. It only has an $800 million budget.56 This is a nominal
amount for a project that must cover nearly the entire American
population. This constraint only allows FEMA to proceed in a
“piecemeal fashion”57 and is limiting the project’s effectiveness. Many
flaws in the older maps are not being corrected.58 The new program’s
data-collection scheme is generic. It fails to account for local variations
49. John Caulfield, New Flood Maps Raise New Land-Use Concerns, BUILDER, (Aug.
14, 2009), available at http://www.builderonline.com/land/new-flood-maps-raise-newland-use-concerns.aspx.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.; Catherine Saillant, New Flood Maps Swamp Homeowners, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2010, at A1.
53. Me. State Planning Office, Floodplain Mapping Modernization,
http://www.maine.gov/spo/flood/maps/mapmodernization.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2010)
[hereinafter Maine SPO].
54. Caulfield, supra note 49.
55. Id.; Lehmann, supra note 6.
56. Caulfield, supra note 49.
57. Portland Officials Push Back on New FEMA Flood Map, COASTAL CONTRACTOR
ONLINE, http://www.coastalcontractor.net/article/288.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010); see
also FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF PARTNER
CONTRIBUTIONS TO FLOOD MAPPING PROJECTS, at 2 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter FEMA].
58. Maine SPO, supra note 53.
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and this can significantly skew the results. FEMA concedes the maps
have accuracy problems.59
The maps are also difficult to understand. They are confusing and
owners are having a hard time determining if their properties are in
designated flood zones or not.60 As a matter of policy, the agency
strongly encourages property owners to question the new maps. It also
acknowledges that it should be doing more outreach to help the public
understand both the maps and their purpose.61
FEMA has sought out an inexpensive solution to all these problems
but it has been met with limited success. The agency knows that local
involvement in the development and maintenance of the maps would
result in better determinations.62 In 1999, it created the Cooperating
Technical Partners (CTP) program,63 which makes local groups official
partners.64 As of 2009, over 236 groups have been made “partners.”65
Through these partnerships, FEMA gains local knowledge without
paying for it.66 The agency also welcomes input from local groups
during the formal comment period, which occurs after a preliminary map
is presented.67 However, many local groups have no interest in bearing
the cost for a program that is resulting in greater building restrictions
without any corresponding benefits.68
As FEMA has introduced the new maps, property owners have been
dismayed by surprisingly higher risk determinations accompanied by
new premiums and building restrictions. In Long Island, 4,700 homes
previously determined to be in a floodplain were removed from that
designation, but 25,000 residents found themselves in newly designated
floodplains.69 The number of affected homes in Sioux Falls, South
Dakota, more than tripled from 800 to 2,600.70 The change in expected

59. Porter, supra note 3.
60. Id.
61. Laura Dolce and Steve Bodnar, Kennebunk, Kennebunkport to Question New
Floodplain Maps, SEACOASTONLINE, (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.seacoastonline.com/
articles/20091210-NEWS-912100375.
62. FEMA, supra note 57, at 2.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(b) (2006).
68. See Porter, supra note 3.
69. Caulfield, supra note 49.
70. Id.
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flooding was also dramatic. In Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, the
new determinations raised the expected flood elevations by eight feet.71
The agency’s lack of outreach has left many homeowners unaware of
their right to question and challenge the new maps.72 One homeowner
from South Los Angeles said the first she heard of the new designation
was when she received a letter from her lender saying she had thirty days
to get a flood insurance policy.73
Many other property owners and local governments have rebuffed
the higher premiums and greater restrictions, with mixed results. One
Los Angeles resident won her dispute after paying $1,400 for a
surveyor.74 A neighborhood group from Southern California met with
limited success. After generating data of its own, it accused FEMA of
rushing the process, producing contradictory maps, and yielding dubious
results.75 It got the agency to postpone adopting the maps for three years
to allow for more study,76 but whether any meaningful change will come
is uncertain. The Moorpark (California) City Council faced a worst-case
scenario. It threw $100,000 into a study that resulted in no meaningful
change.77
A. Portland Harbor
In July 2009, FEMA released its preliminary maps for Portland
Harbor in Maine.78 Portland Harbor is the largest foreign inbound transit
tonnage port in the U.S. 79 It is one of the few working waterfronts in the
U.S.80 It is the second largest oil port on the East Coast.81 It is also the
largest tonnage seaport in New England and its second largest fishing
port.82 Representatives from other major ports in the region, including
Boston, closely watched Portland’s re-mapping process.83

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 4104(b) (1983).
Saillant, supra note 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bell, supra note 7.
Portland’s Downtown District, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bell, supra note 7.
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Portland Harbor’s new maps showed a drastically higher flood risk.
Its piers and wharves used to be in an “A-zone.”84 This means it was
expected that one foot of flooding would occur once every 100 years.85
This is the lowest floodplain designation. In the new maps, however, the
piers and wharves were placed in a “V-zone.”86 This is one of the
highest risk designations.87 “V” is short for velocity.88 High velocity
wind and waves were expected to impact the areas so designated.89
Specifically, high velocity winds were expected to whip up three foot
waves once every one hundred years.90 Catastrophic consequences are
expected. Large waves would crash into land and tear down buildings or
cause substantial structural damage.91 FEMA’s flood risk assessment
had drastically swung from quite mild to extremely dangerous.
This new determination brings with it severe building restrictions.92
In the previous “A-zone” classification, harbor structures were only
required to maintain a slightly raised ground floor: one foot above
normal.93 But with a “V-zone” designation there is a complete ban on
new construction.94 In addition, current buildings cannot be fully rebuilt
if they need repair.95 They can only be rebuilt to half their value.96
Currently over the harbor piers and wharves sit condominiums, offices,
restaurants, and lobstermen.97 The new designation would likely halt all
development and leave lobstermen and other fishermen as the only
remaining tenants.98
Before the new maps were released, a study was done that showed
immeasurable property development potential for the waterfront.99 The
84. Lehmann, supra note 6.
85. Institute for Business and Home Safety, HURRICANE IKE: NATURE’S FORCE VS.
STRUCTURAL STRENGTH 7 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.disastersafety.org/
resource/resmgr/pdfs/hurricane_ike.pdf [hereinafter IBHS].
86. Lehmann, supra note 6.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Lehmann, supra note 6.
93. Id.
94. Bell, supra note 7.
95. Id.
96. Bell, supra note 5.
97. Lehmann, supra note 6.
98. Porter, supra note 3.
99. Rebecca Goldfine, Waterfront a development goldmine, MAINEBIZ, Dec. 8, 2009,
available at http://www.mainebiz.biz/news45565.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
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study found more than 20 acres of development property.100 A
centerpiece of the development opportunity was the seven-acre Maine
State Pier.101 The study also emphasized attractive features such as the
port’s expanding cruise ship commerce and a ready market for a hotel on
the waterfront.102 This is in a city that already sports a vibrant waterfront
shopping and dining culture.103
The study was done by a real estate consulting firm that specialized
in lesser known New England markets, including Providence, Rhode
Island, and was presented to the leading investment groups in the area,
including private equity fund managers and bankers.104 Portland is
Northern New England’s banking capital,105 in addition to Maine’s
economic and commercial hub. Finalized after the release of FEMA’s
maps, the study warned about the negative economic consequences of
the new restrictions.106
B. Portland’s Response
Local officials feared the potential economic impact of the
restrictions. Besides losing development due to the complete restriction
on new construction, they worried that the new disincentive to build
would lead to properties falling into disrepair, causing a blight on the
community in general, a condition that Portland once experienced and
does not want to see return. Officials had 30 days to respond to the new
maps and did so vigorously. City and state leaders, including most of
Maine’s congressional delegation, urged FEMA officials to reconsider.107
They used political pressure, called for the creation of a regulatory
niche for harbors, and made an economic argument. U.S. Senator Susan
Collins used the occasion of the August confirmation hearing of the
second highest FEMA official, Deputy Administrator Richard Serino, to
bring attention to the Portland problem. The ranking Republican on the
Senate Homeland Security Committee (which oversees FEMA), Collins
called for the agency to work with local officials to produce a more
accurate risk assessment.108
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Portland’s Downtown District, supra note 2.
Goldfine, supra note 99.
Portland’s Downtown District, supra note 2.
Id.
Porter, supra note 3.
Bell, supra note 7.
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The following day, the agency decided to delay the remapping of the
harbor. It suspended the 90-day appeal period, which had been
scheduled to commence immediately following the comment period.
FEMA cited technical errors in the community notification process as the
reason for the delay. Perhaps the agency feared litigation, a possibility
which Collins referenced in her testimony.109 In 2005, the U.S. District
Court of South Carolina invalidated FEMA’s map determinations for
Richland County, S.C., because it failed to give proper notice of the start
of the comment period.110
Although FEMA may have yielded to political pressure to postpone
the finalization of its maps, it is loath to change any maps on political
pressure alone without any scientific data to validate such a change.111
The agency would face severe criticism for shifting its position based on
political pressure.112 Moreover, Congress has charged FEMA to alter a
flood map only if it is scientifically or technically incorrect.113
Local leaders began pointing at specific weaknesses in the agency’s
findings. Much of it was based on information not specific to the harbor
area. This is a well-established flaw of the mapping program. FEMA
analyzed the less calm eastern section of the shore and failed to take into
account the calmer western region.114 FEMA also mistakenly found that
a seventy-one mile per hour wind could persist for an hour over the
harbor.115 Sustained winds have never exceeded fifty miles per hour.116
City officials recommended the agency place a tidal gauge in the harbor
for a year to get a more realistic impression.117
To have a chance at being persuasive, local officials knew they
needed compelling data. “We follow the science,” said one FEMA

109. Bell, supra note 7.
110. Columbia Venture, LLC, et al v. S.C. Wildlife Fed. et al, 2008 WL 2307394
*3 (Appellate Brief) (4th Cir. May 15, 2008) (Response Brief of Columbia Venture, LLC
et al). FEMA appealed the decision, and the Fourth Circuit reversed it, holding that the
notice failure was harmless error. Columbia Venture, LLC v. S.C. Wildlife Fed., 562
F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 2009). The mistake in Portland was that the agency’s notification
letter was addressed to former Mayor Ed Suslovic, when it should have been addressed to
the city’s chief executive, Joe Gray. Bell, supra note 7. Presumably, this is also harmless
error considering the fact that Gray had little trouble learning of the news.
111. Lehmann, supra note 6.
112. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(b).
114. Bell, supra note 5.
115. Porter, supra note 3.
116. Goldfine, supra note 99.
117. Lehmann supra note 6.
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official.118 Portland engaged an engineering firm, which collected
significantly more measurement points than FEMA. It statistically
established the wave-calming influence of the harbor islands and more
accurately depicted potential wave action.119 The city hoped the new
data would lead to a redrawn map.120
Portland’s scientific input was welcomed by FEMA. The agency
encourages local participation. “Now if someone like the city of
Portland comes and says, ‘Well, you were gathering your scientific
information from this point in the area, and we have other validated
scientific information from another point,’ then of course we look at
that,” said agency spokesman Dennis Pinkham.121 FEMA’s Regional
Administrator Paul Ford agreed to review Portland’s entire study.122
The agency took steps to improve its findings. It reran some specific
modeling.123 FEMA had analyzed how a one hundred year storm would
affect the Portland Fish Pier, which is located toward the eastern section
of the harbor. Originally, it showed that five foot waves would occur.124
The second time, the modeling resulted in a much lower wave height:
only three feet, three inches.125 This is just barely high enough to qualify
for the V-zone designation. The cut-off is three feet. FEMA
acknowledged that it might do some other reanalysis as well.126 One
spokesman admitted that, “there is certainly additional modeling and
more detailed modeling that could be done.”127
He warned, however, “That [it] may or not make a difference in
terms of what the maps look like.”128 If Portland’s efforts are
unsuccessful, there will be no reimbursement from the agency129 for the
cost of the city’s studies, which is at least $10,000.130 The city officials
urged the federal government to stop shifting the re-mapping cost onto

118. Lehmann, supra note 6.
119. Kessler, supra note 4.
120. Id.
121. Porter, supra note 3.
122. Bell, supra note 7.
123. Tom Bell, Local Cities Join to Fight FEMA Over Flood Zoning, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Sept. 5, 2009, at A1.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kessler, supra note 4.
127. Bell, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(f) (2006).
130. Bell, supra note 123. Portland’s neighbor South Portland chipped in at least
$5,000. Id.
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local communities.131 U.S. Congresswoman Pingree said this is an unfair
burden that “should have [been borne by] FEMA in the first place.”132
U.S. Senator Susan Collins also found it “troubling” that Portland must
“shoulder the financial burdens of correcting FEMA’s mistakes.”133
At the same time that they was challenging FEMA’s data, local
officials were calling on Congress and FEMA to draw up laws and
regulations that better suit urban waterfronts. Portland Harbor and others
like it have a different natural environment. The FEMA’s program is
best applicable to environmentally sensitive areas like coastal plains, not
to fishing ports in sheltered harbors.134 These harbors are chosen
specifically because they are better protected naturally. They do not
have the same vulnerability. They should not receive the same treatment
nor bear the same mitigation costs. FEMA will continue to run into
resistance from port cities. It should carve out an exception for working
waterfronts, which do not fit FEMA’s homogeneous method.
Local officials supported this contention with anecdotal and
technical evidence. Portland Harbor is densely-built, has been developed
over several hundred years, and has proven itself in the worst weather.135
The harbor’s piers and wharves calm waves.136 Government frigates and
major passenger and commercial vessels use Portland as a safe harbor.
No catastrophic storm has hit Portland Harbor in the last one hundred
years (the period of time used to establish flooding risk).137 For any
flooding to occur, the harbor tide gauge must exceed 12 feet.138 The
highest tide ever recorded was only 2 feet higher at 14.17 feet when the
infamous Blizzard of 1978 damaged one of the wharves.139 An April
2007 storm, locally remembered as the Patriot’s Day storm, which
brought down several moored boats, caused no damage to the wharves
and only crested the 12 foot mark by 1 foot, reaching 13.28.140 The
owner of a two hundred year old concrete pier could find no documented

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Porter, supra note 3.
Lehmann, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Bell, supra note 5.
Id.
Lehmann, supra note 6.
Bell, supra note 5.
Id.
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evidence of 3 foot wave damage in its storied history.141 Pier owners
have made no significant insurance claims.142
Local officials also felt that economic factors should be considered
when determining building restrictions. Collins said FEMA’s maps
should not “unduly burden[] the city and its residents.”143 U.S.
Congresswoman Pingree called the restrictions on development a “huge
economic burden” that would be “devastating” given the current
economic climate “in particular.”144 A city official said “what you are in
effect doing is putting these waterfronts out of business.”145 City
officials acknowledged that protecting lives and property is paramount
but felt that economic considerations should not be wholly ignored.146
IV. NEED FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Science and safety are essential, but economic factors are also
important. They should be considered whenever practical. To support
this proposition one need look no further than the NFIP itself. It was
created to address economic concerns, primarily the growing financial
burden of flooding on the federal government. The program’s insurance
component was designed to shift this burden off the general taxpayer and
onto those taking the risk. The program’s mitigation component was
also intended to reduce financial exposure.
There should be economic safeguards in place so that FEMA’s
mitigation determinations, such as building restrictions, do not create a
worse economic situation than before. Ironically, mitigation efforts may
actually be increasing the overall economic cost of flooding. This is due
to the cost of lost opportunity. Building restrictions may be warranted
where development potential is slight. Severe restrictions may even be
desirable where development potential is high because the risk of
flooding and the cost of rebuilding are also high. But in places like
Portland, where the economic opportunity is high and the risk of flooding
low, building restrictions may be ill-advised. Here, the natural human
aversion to mitigation may be well-placed: potential future benefits will
not exceed the initial economic sacrifice.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Lehmann, supra note 6.
See Bell, supra note 7.
Bell, supra note 7.
Porter, supra note 3.
Bell, supra note 7.
Id.
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Sheltered harbors that drive major economic activity litter the coast.
In places like Portland, there is little evidence that mitigation will prevent
much property damage. In Portland there has been minute damage to the
waterfront over centuries because of natural defenses. Where little
damage is likely, are economically destructive restrictions on
development appropriate? This is an especially apropos question in the
present economic climate.
The economic importance of coastal development is indisputable.
The property that runs along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts alone is valued
at $9 trillion.147 Much of this is attributable to giant commercial centers,
derived from their mercantile past where they served as conduit points
between the shipping lanes of the open ocean and the inland networks of
road and rail.
Not only financial health but psychological well-being is also at
stake. The high economic value of coastal land is not merely about
dollars and cents.148 The purely recreational and personal value of the
coast cannot be denied. People love the coast. This fact is evident from
the massive wealth on display in mansions and resorts from Bar Harbor,
Maine to Sarasota, Florida and in places like Newport, Rhode Island.
People love to be near the water, especially the coast where they can
watch the sublime movements of the currents go on until they meet the
vast, open sky. People enjoy watching boats float atop the ocean’s
bosom. They like to interact where the land and ocean meet in work and
in play in ways they have done for millennia.
Governments also recognize this value. Their respect for the
personal and public pursuit of waterfront living can be seen from Oregon
to the Great Lakes to Maine. They support public access, right-of-ways,
and the public trust doctrine. The federal government should not
discourage this natural pursuit of waterfront living by pushing people
away through questionable mitigation policies. Either FEMA through
regulation, or Congress through statute, should incorporate economic
factors into the agency’s mitigation determinations.
FEMA’s limited ability to collect accurate data is another reason for
incorporating economic factors. For its part, FEMA is an agency with a
mindset for technical data. A spokesman involved in the Portland
mapping project said that “[o]ur job is to map risk and identify that risk
and put it on the map as best we can. That is our job and what we are
147. IBHS, supra note 85, at 4.
148. When the Author refers to the economic value of coastal development, he is
including in that term its psychological value which plays a role in determining coastal
property’s monetary value.
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charged by Congress to do.”149 As a result, FEMA rightfully puts a lot of
focus on accuracy, but because of its limited resources, its data-collection
is limited and homogeneous, and often a poor predictor. The agency
could compensate for this weakness by considering other, nonphysical
factors.
The mechanism for incorporating economic factors could be as
follows. First, as it does now, FEMA would ascertain as accurately as
possible the flood predictors, but this would not be the final determinant.
Second, it would derive from the flood maps the building restrictions
necessary to prevent property damage. Third, it would determine the
financial savings that would result. Fourth, it would discount the
projected savings by the projected loss of economic development.
Where the savings exceed the loss, the requirements should be
implemented. Where the loss exceeds the savings, lesser restrictions
should be applied as safety permits. This would produce a much more
economically efficient mitigation plan. Even if FEMA’s current analysis
accounts for lost opportunity to some degree, this needs to be more
robust, as evidenced by Portland, where the restrictions were overly
damaging economically.
With the likelihood that FEMA lacks authority or political will to
incorporate economic factors into its determinations, Congress should
mandate it. It has started down this road. On July 15, 2010, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed legislation that would require FEMA to
study “the impact of working waterfronts on storm and flood risk.”150
Portland’s U.S. Representative, Chellie Pingree, introduced the
amendment as a direct result of the city’s experience.151 The requirement
is part of a larger bill to reform the NFIP but it will have difficulty
clearing the Senate. Even if it becomes law, the changes will not take
effect until the next re-mapping program,152 which could be decades
away. That will be too late to help port cities stuck with restrictions on
development as a result of this current re-mapping effort.

149. Bell, supra note 5.
150. Flood Ins. Reform Priorities Act of 2010, H.R. 5114, 111th Cong. H. AMDT.
718(9) (2010).
151. Steve Mistler, Problems with FEMA Maps for Maine Help Spur Change in Flood
Insurance
Bill,
THE
FORECASTER,
July
21,
2010
(available
at
http://www.theforecaster.net/content/pnms-femamaps-3 (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
152. Id.
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V. AVOIDING ECONOMIC LOSS
Portland will not be one of those port cities. In June 2010, FEMA
released revised maps.153 With the exception of the Maine State Pier, the
entire harbor was put back into an “A-zone,” where there are no
significant building restrictions.154 The agency had been persuaded by
local efforts and essentially reversed its position. The harbor’s private
property owners will be free to develop. In October 2010, FEMA went a
step further. It again withdrew its maps, this time in favor of an entirely
new program which calls for total collaboration with local authorities.155
Local groups may be spared much of the cost of their studies, so long as
they are made “incident to any appeal.”156 Congress requires FEMA to
reimburse parties that win their appeals, though only for expenses
directly related to the agency’s changed position.157 Expenses incurred
during the comment period may not be considered “incident to any
appeal” and may not be reimbursable. Whether or not political or
economic influences had a strong effect on these outcomes, FEMA and
local officials credited the new, locally supplied data for the change.158
Not all results will be as cheery as Portland’s. Several major coastal
cities still stand in the eye of the re-mapping storm, including Boston,
Providence, Portsmouth (New Hampshire), and New Haven
(Connecticut). If these cities are stuck with restrictions on development,
they should first appeal FEMA’s final decision to a U.S. District Court.
However, a favorable outcome is not promising. For organizations with
vast financial resources, an appeal could be advantageous. It could
provide leverage over an agency eager to avoid expensive litigation.159
But most municipalities, even large cities, cannot afford expensive
litigation, especially in this tight economic climate.

153. Bell, supra note 1.
154. Id.
155. Tom Bell, FEMA Pulls Flood Maps for Two Counties, Portland Press Herald, Oct.
2, 2010, at A1.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(f) (2006).
157. Id.
158. Bell, supra note 1.
159. See Dan McCue, Columbia Venture Sues Richland County Over Land Dispute,
Free
Times,
Nov.
11,
2009,
http://www.free-times.com/index.php?cat=
121304064644348&z_Issue_ID=11010311090903415&
ShowArchiveArticle_ID=11010411093056358&Year=2009 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010)
(Columbia Venture, a land developer in South Carolina, is still fighting a 2001 flood map
determination).
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Even if a port city could afford to mount an appeal, courts are
unlikely to reverse FEMA’s determinations because of highly deferential
standards of review. Judicial review is governed by the Administrative
Procedures Act.160 As such, a de novo review would only be available if
the agency determination was adjudicatory in nature.161 Courts have
repeatedly held that flood map determinations are not adjudicatory, but
quasi-legislative.162 As a result, the court will only look to see if the
determination was arbitrary or capricious.163 The cards are stacked even
further against appellants by courts’ deferral to FEMA’s technical
expertise.164
A port city could not even use pending litigation to temporarily
enjoin the implementation of the determinations. Congress specifically
provided that maps go into effect despite pending litigation.165 There is
an exception if good cause is shown, but this would be little help. A port
city could argue that FEMA’s determinations were inaccurate or
insufficient but a court would likely see FEMA’s technical data as
authoritative. A port city could also make a public policy argument on
economic grounds, but this would also fail because there is no support
for it in the governing statutory and regulatory laws.
A. A Port City’s Spectrum of Options
With dim prospects in an appeal, a port city can look to three other
options which run along a spectrum. Sitting to one side of the spectrum
is the option to completely submit to FEMA’s building restrictions. This
option is politically feasible. Port city officials would keep their jobs
because they would preserve subsidized flood insurance for their
citizens. A catastrophic event is unforeseeable in cities like Portland, but
voters know that some isolated flooding, inland or otherwise, is liable to
occur. Wary of their own potential loss, these voters would be happy
that they still have their affordable insurance and would not be so
160. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(g) (2006) (This subsection references chapter 7 of title 5, which
is the Administrative Procedures Act).
161. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1973); Falls Chase Special Taxing Distr. v.
Dir. Fed. Emerg. Mgmt. Agency, 580 F. Supp. 967, 970 (N.D. Fla. 1983).
162. Falls Chase Special Taxing Distr., 580 F. Supp., at 970; City of Wenatchee v.
U.S., 526 F. Supp. 439, 441 (D. Wash., 1981); Tex. Landowners Rights Ass’n v. Harris,
453 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (D.D.C. 1978).
163. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 4104(g) (2006); Falls Chase Special
Taxing Distr., 580 F. Supp., at 970.
164. Falls Chase Special Taxing Distr., 580 F. Supp. at 970.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(g) (2006).
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concerned about losing economic development on the waterfront. They
would directly feel the effect of losing flood insurance (even if just on
their psyche) but would not feel any direct or immediate loss from a bar
against development. However, the long-term economic consequences
of such a move could be devastating.
Officials could look to the opposite end of the spectrum and choose
to completely withdraw from the NFIP. This would be economically
beneficial overall. Breaking ties with the program would set a port city
free to exploit waterfront development. It would also spell the end of
subsidized insurance, but cities like Portland, with natural physical
barriers, do not suffer the serious coastal and inland flooding seen in the
Midwest, Gulf region, and Northern California. Subsidized flood
insurance is not as economically significant in places like Portland.
Some property owners would suffer flood damage, but the city could use
funds derived from waterfront development to aid them.
Although withdrawal is economically favorable, the loss of
subsidized insurance would be politically untenable. There would be
some voters in favor of withdrawal because it would end the unpopular
requirement that owners of high risk properties purchase insurance.166
However, the political support for subsidized insurance would be much
more powerful.
B. Non-Compliance and Its Favorable Legal Landscape
While submission at one end of the spectrum is economically
dangerous, and withdrawal at the other end is politically untenable, in the
center lies a more palatable option. A port city could remain in the
NFIP, but not comply with the building restrictions. With this option,
the city could try to maintain the best of both worlds. It could have
economically vital waterfront development and politically valuable
subsidized insurance. Based on history, a port city could be successful
taking this approach.
FEMA has limited oversight ability. The drive to develop has been
too powerful for the agency’s limited resources. According to Professor
Oliver Houck, where the flooding risk is low and the building restrictions
are modest, compliance is generally good because “no one’s shoe is
pinched.”167 But, where the risk is high and the restrictions on

166. GAO, supra note 8, at 14.
167. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 164 (1985).
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development are severe, development overrides compliance.168 Even
“an army of inspectors”169 could not oversee all twenty-thousand
participating communities. A non-complying port city could easily fly
under the radar.
A port city has every reason to try non-compliance because even if it
gets caught, FEMA’s sanctions are light. The agency penalizes a noncomplying community by removing it from the NFIP, but it is allowed to
return to the program in full as soon as it implements a mechanism to
enforce FEMA’s building restrictions. This is a reform which could be
accomplished in a relatively short time. A port city would only see a
brief hiatus from the program. No other sanctions or penalties are
imposed. As Professor Houck laments, “a sanction which merely
removes a non-complying community from the program until it cleans
house would, in effect, be license to get away with the maximum
infractions before the inspectors arrived.”170
Sparse monitoring coupled with a light penalty means that a noncomplying port city could enjoy years of unmonitored waterfront
development with little risk of reprisal. At worst, it would suffer a brief
time-out from the NFIP before returning to the program in full. Perhaps,
it could lapse back into non-compliance again a short time later. This
cycle could go on indefinitely.
1. Courts’ Unwillingness to Burden Municipalities with Liability
Pursuing a remedy in the court system would seem like a good idea
for FEMA, but the courts have been reluctant to assign liability to noncomplying municipalities. A successful court decision or two would be a
relatively inexpensive tool for FEMA in compelling compliance
nationwide, but the courts have been historically unwilling to burden
municipalities with “massive” contractual or tort liability.
The seminal case on contract liability is U.S. v. Parish of St.
Bernard, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
1985.171 The Parish of St. Bernard was a poor Louisiana municipality
that disregarded NFIP requirements to mitigate future flood damage.
The community was regularly barraged by storms and flooding. In 1978,

168.
169.
170.
171.
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756 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied.
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1980, and 1982, storms caused at least $93 million in flood claims.172
These claims could have been avoided if St. Bernard had fulfilled its
obligations to mitigate flooding.173 FEMA174 argued that St. Bernard’s
obligation was contractual and that it was liable for all damages
stemming from its breach. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, refusing to
recognize a contract and subject municipalities to “unlimited liability.”
It rested its decision on its finding that there was no statement in either
the NFIA or FEMA’s regulations literally declaring that participation
creates a contract.175 Nothing short of that would establish a contract.
Courts are also reluctant to find municipalities liable in tort. In St.
Bernard, the Fifth Circuit set down a precedent that essentially bars
FEMA from bringing a negligence claim against non-compliant
communities. St. Bernard could not hide behind sovereign immunity
(abandoned in Louisiana), nor could it readily shield itself from tort
liability under the public duty doctrine; but nevertheless, the court denied
most tort claims. To do this, it extended its contract holding.176 Because
the court held that Congress did not intend to heap unlimited contractual
liability upon municipalities, it must not have intended to assign massive
tort liability either.177 According to the court, “[i]t is unreasonable to
argue . . . that the NFIP, a program designed to lessen the massive public
outlay for federal disaster assistance, could be foisted in its entire cost
onto the very people Congress was trying to protect from the prohibitive
cost of flooding.”178
However, in some instances courts will allow FEMA to bring a tort
claim. In St. Bernard, the Fifth Circuit established the precedent that the
agency can pursue subrogation claims. The court recognized that
insurance law, including the principle of subrogation, applied to the
NFIP. Although the court found that FEMA lacks standing to pursue its
own negligence claims, its private insureds can subrogate their claims to
the agency. This could be a viable avenue for FEMA because it could
stand in the shoes of a large number of claimants and seek substantial
damages.

172. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, The Parish of St. Bernard v. U.S., No. 85-332,
1985 WL 694981 (U.S.). [hereinafter St. Bernard Petition].
173. U.S. v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied.
174. This action was also brought on behalf of the Federal Insurance Administration
(FIA), which was responsible for administering the NFIP before FEMA. Id.
175. Id. at 1121.
176. Id. at 1126-28.
177. Id. at 1127-28.
178. Id.
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However, once in court, FEMA has historically been unable to show
causation. Courts have been reluctant to find that municipality
negligence is the proximate cause of flooding damage. Flooding arises
amidst major weather events, and courts usually find that they are
proximately caused by an “act of God.”179 Showing that damage is not
caused by a severe natural disaster is a high evidentiary hurdle. Proving
this for enough properties to make a suit monetarily worthwhile is even
tougher. The combination of these two factors significantly deters
FEMA from making subrogation claims.180
The Fifth Circuit prevented FEMA from asserting other causes of
action as well. It ruled that the NFIA did not imply a private right of
action.181 It also denied FEMA the right to sue a municipality over
damage to its own public property.182 The court recognized the insurance
law principle that an insurer cannot sue its insured.183 FEMA, therefore,
cannot sue a municipality with respect to its own property. Insurance
law makes an exception when the insured acts fraudulently, but this
exception is of little use to FEMA. Intentional non-compliance may
amount to fraud, but evidentiary problems combined with monetary
concerns render such a claim impractical.184 The amount of damages
would not be “litigation-worthy.”185 Only a fraction of all insured
properties are public.
2. Potential and Existing Risks
A non-complying port city sees a very favorable legal landscape, but
risks do exist. The court’s position could erode significantly in the areas
of both contract and tort. Courts could begin to see non-compliance as
bad faith. A court wishing to punish this behavior has a readily
accessible option. It need look no further than the shaky principles
underpinning the Fifth Circuit’s contract holding in St. Bernard. That
court briskly passed by FEMA’s logical argument that a contract existed.
The agency plainly asserted that a municipality’s agreement to comply

179. See Gabler v. Regent Dev. Corp., 470 So. 2d 149, 162 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1985).
180. See Houck, supra note 167, at 156.
181. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1122-23.
182. Id. at 1128.
183. Id. at 1127.
184. Houck, supra note 167, at 156.
185. Id.
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with federally imposed conditions in return for subsidized insurance is in
the nature of a contract.186
A more in-depth analysis than the court gave inevitably leads to the
conclusion that FEMA was right. In holding that no contract existed, the
Fifth Circuit relied upon Pennhurst State Schools & Hospital v.
Halderman,187 but misinterpreted its holding. Pennhurst established that
a contract exists when Congress imposes an obligation as a condition of
federal funding.188 The key is that an obligation is imposed. Mere
precatory language, such as an expression of a simple desire or the
encouragement of certain behavior, will not create a contract.189 In fact,
Pennhurst recognized the “well-settled” distinction between
“encouragement” and the “imposition of binding obligations.”190 It also
confirmed that Congress understood this difference and its
significance.191
To better understand the distinction between a contractual obligation
and mere precatory language, Pennhurst provided several working
definitions, including the following three. First, King v. Smith provided
an example of a contract.192 In King, Alabama received federal funds
under the Social Security Act, but breached its obligation to aid needy
families with children.193 The U.S. Supreme Court found that 42 U.S.C.
§§ 603, 602(a)(9) (1964) created a contractual obligation.194 Section
603(a) established the main part of the obligation. It read, in pertinent
part, that “the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay to each State which has
an approved plan for aid and services to needy families with children . . .
.”195 This subsection established a state’s obligations to have an
approved plan as a condition of receiving federal funding. This is a
simple and clear quid pro quo.
Section 602(a)(9) provided the specific part of the plan that Alabama
violated. It read: “A State plan for aid and services to needy families
with children must . . . provide . . . that aid to dependent children shall be
furnished with reasonable promptness . . . .”196 This subsection
186.
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188.
189.
190.
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established that an approved plan includes the prompt furnishing of aid
to dependent children. The two subsections, read together, established
that Alabama was contractually obligated to provide prompt aid.
Alabama had not done this, and the Court found this to be a breach of
contract. Thus, the Court found a contract even though Congress did not
literally state that a contract was created.
The Pennhurst Court provided another example of a contract by
pointing to language in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act of 1975.197 One of the Act’s funding sections, 42
U.S.C. § 6063, stated: “[a]ny State desiring to take advantage of this
subchapter [funding for University Affiliated Programs] must have a
State plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary under this
section.”198 As in King, this language imposed a contractual obligation
upon participating states to have an approved plan in return for federal
funding. This is another clear quid pro quo. Section 6063 went on to
enumerate the specific requirements of the plan. Failure to satisfy those
requirements would result in a contractual breach. Here, as in King,
Congress did not specifically state that a contract is created.
The Pennhurst Court also provided an example of language that did
not create a contract. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act of 1975 also set forth certain rights, including the
following: “Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to
appropriate treatment . . . .”199 It was argued that this language imposed
an obligation upon states to provide “appropriate treatment.” However,
the Court held that this was a mere Congressional affirmation, akin to a
purpose statement, that had no specific bearing on the relationship
between the states and the federal government. It did not impose a duty
upon states to act. It was not a condition of federal funding.200 There
was no consideration or quid pro quo. The establishment of this right is
much more precatory in nature than contractual. Congress would have to
speak much more clearly than this to create a contractual obligation.
When compared to these examples, the NFIA clearly reflects a
Congressional intent to impose a contractual obligation upon
participating municipalities. Notably, § 4022 of the NFIA reads: “no . . .
flood insurance coverage shall be provided under this chapter [National
Flood Insurance] in any area (or subdivision thereof) unless an
appropriate public body shall have adopted adequate land use and control
197.
198.
199.
200.

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 23.
42 U.S.C. § 6063(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1983).
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measures (with effective enforcement provisions) which the Director
finds are consistent with the comprehensive criteria for land management
and use . . . .”201 Here, just as in King and in the Pennhurst funding
section, there is an expectation that the municipality will fulfill an
obligation before receiving federal funding.
Congress clearly
conditioned the receipt of subsidized flood insurance on the adoption and
enforcement of building restrictions. This is an obvious quid pro quo.
This is not the only section in the NFIA that shows a Congressional
intent to impose a contractual obligation. It can also be seen in § 4012:
The Director shall make flood insurance available in only those
States or areas (or subdivisions thereof) which he has determined
have . . . given satisfactory assurance that . . . adequate land use
and control measures will have been adopted [as specifically
required] . . . and that the application and enforcement of such
measures will commence as soon as technical information . . . is
available.202
Here again, there is an expectation that flood insurance will only be
given to those municipalities that promise to comply with FEMA’s
building restrictions. A promise is a clear contractual obligation. This is
another obvious quid pro quo.
The language of the NFIA also shows that Congress knew the
difference between contractual and precatory language.
It used
contractual language when laying out municipalities’ obligations in the
sections just described. It used simple precatory language when laying
out general principles that were merely purpose statements. In §
4001(e), the first section of the act, Congress stated: “It is the further
purpose of this chapter [National Flood Insurance] to (1) encourage State
and local governments to make appropriate land use adjustments to
constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage and
minimize damage caused by flood losses . . . .”203 This was the only time
Congress used the word “encourage” in a precatory context.
It used the term “encourage” in a later section of the NFIA, but the
purpose of that usage was not to express a Congressional wish. In §
4102(c), Congress stated that
the [FEMA Administrator] shall from time to time develop
comprehensive criteria designed to encourage, where necessary,
the adoption of adequate State and local measures which, to the
201. 42 U.S.C. § 4022(a)(1) (2006).
202. Id. § 4012(c) (2006).
203. Id. § 4001(e) (2006) (emphasis added).
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maximum extent feasible, will– (1) constrict the development of
land which is exposed to flood damage where appropriate, (2)
guide the development of proposed construction away from
locations which are threatened by flood hazards, (3) assist in
reducing damage caused by floods, and (4) otherwise improve
the long-range land management and use of flood-prone areas . .
. .204
Here, “encourage” is not the active verb. It is not the focus of the
sentence. The focus of the sentence is the design of adequate criteria.
The active verb is “designed.” “Encourage” is used as an infinitive. Its
purpose is merely to describe adequate criteria.
While courts could easily find municipalities contractually liable,
some are already beginning to find them tortiously liable. Not all courts
are willing to allow the ever-present “act of God” defense to immunize
municipalities from tort liability. Courts have grown more willing to
find that municipality negligence is the proximate cause of flooding.
They are especially willing to assign liability when the municipality
creates or perpetuates a known hazard.205 As a result, suits against
municipalities have been increasing.206 For example, in Saden v. Kirby
(1995), a municipal water and sewer board was held liable for flooding
that followed heavy rains in 1983.207 The Supreme Court of Louisiana
found that the proximate cause of some of the flooding was the board’s
failure to repair certain known structural problems before the rains came.
Some of the flooding was attributable to an “act of God,” but expert
witnesses convinced the court that the height of the flood waters would
have been several inches lower had the repairs been made beforehand.
The board was held liable for that part of the damage that resulted from
the higher flood levels.208
VI. CONCLUSION
A port city could end up in front of a court that is willing to find
contractual or tort liability. There is ready-made case law that would
strongly support a finding of contractual liability, and we are already
beginning to see liability for negligence. Nevertheless, the overall
204. Id. § 4102(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
205. Jon A. Kusler, Liability as a Dilemma for Local Managers, 45 PUB. AD. REV. 118,
120 (1985).
206. Id.
207. Saden v. Kirby, 660 So. 2d 423, 430 (La. 1995).
208. Id.
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present legal landscape is favorable for a non-complying community.
Courts are still mostly entrenched in their unwillingness to assign
massive liability to municipalities. For twenty-five years, St. Bernard
has stood as a testament to the fact that courts do not want to make cashstrapped municipalities financially beholden to the federal government.
Port cities have another powerful force on their side: the force
majeure. The concept of force majeure has an imposing presence in
negligence cases. The assumption that a force majeure is the proximate
cause of flooding is a tall obstacle for FEMA to surmount. The expense
of making such an evidentiary showing would not warrant a suit.
Monetary judgments would not be high enough. Port cities’ natural
defenses would keep flooding damage relatively low. If FEMA imposes
severe restrictions on development that are unwarranted because the
flooding risk is low and economic opportunity high, port cities should
not comply.
While port cities pursue non-compliance, Congress and FEMA
should work to incorporate economic factors into the determination of
floodplain building restrictions. A first step in the right direction would
be the creation of a statutory and regulatory niche for working
waterfronts. This body of law would recognize the natural protection
these harbors have from flooding. There is a reason why thriving centers
of commerce and economic activity have risen up in these areas, and
they should be allowed to continue to thrive. Certainly their economic
health should not be threatened by off-base predictions. The NFIP,
created to reduce financial exposure, should not be a source of economic
harm.

